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ABSTRACT 
This paper investigates the decision-making processes guiding postdisaster infrastructure reconstruction—
concentrating on wastewater, water supply, stormwater and road networks (“horizontal infrastructure”). It draws 
on empirical analysis of the postearthquake reconstruction currently underway in Christchurch, New Zealand.  
Restoring infrastructure services to provide at least a basic level of essential services after a disaster helps wider 
economic recovery. Subsequently, there is pressure to restore infrastructure services to predisaster levels as 
quickly as possible. Reconstruction programmes thus commence in highly uncertain decision-making 
environments and are reactive to perceived, immediate needs. The extent and nature of the work is later clarified 
and re-evaluated as projects progress. This context of postdisaster response presents unique challenges in 
terms of design and delivery processes.  
The focus of this paper is to address the impact of such institutional and organizational arrangements on 
postdisaster reconstruction decisions. It also discusses changes in decision making that occur over time as 
needs change. It does this through examining changes in the overall design philosophy and approaches to 
prioritization and deferment in the Christchurch case study. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, research into 
postdisaster reconstruction has endeavoured to 
develop an understanding of the fundamental 
elements of best-practice approaches for disaster 
recovery. This has contributed to emerging theories 
on housing reconstruction (Hayles, 2010); 
postdisaster planning processes (Olshansky, 
Hopkins, & Johnson, 2012); and discussion of 
institutional, regulatory, and financing arrangements 
(Fengler, Ihsan, &Kaiser, 2008; Rotimi, 2010). There 
has also been a recent focus on the role of donor 
organizations in decision making, particularly 
international organizations that intervene in 
managing a postdisaster situation (Kennedy, 
Ashmore, Babister, & Kelman, 2008). Understanding 
the reconstruction process from the perspective of 
restoring a city’s wastewater, water supply, 
stormwater and transport services (collectively 
defined here as “horizontal networks”) is an 
important yet overlooked aspect of postdisaster 
reconstruction. These networks are fundamental to 
urban development. Governments around the world 
are concerned with the degradation of network 
assets and insufficient investment in infrastructure 
(e.g., Engineers Australia, 2010; American Society of 
Civil Engineers [ASCE], 2013). Postdisaster 
reconstruction typically involves significant capital 
investment into these networks. While the capital 
available may be limited in terms of repairing 
damage caused by a disaster, the budget can be 
many times greater than the typical annual renewal 
and maintenance budget. Decisions on how to 
distribute this money have long-term implications for 
both the cost of maintaining the infrastructure and 
the ability for communities to function and grow. 
Understanding the process behind these decisions 
will contribute to a better understanding of the 
challenges for introducing improvements and acting 
upon perceived opportunities for change. The 
process is influenced by both the structure of funding 
arrangements and the boundaries placed on the 
process by which various options are assessed. 
These boundaries are influenced by the size and 
complexity of recovery efforts, where the damage 
caused overwhelms the capacity of existing local 
government and new organizational relationships 
form to support the recovery.  
This paper reviews how infrastructure decisions are 
influenced by the institutional (i.e., the policies, 
systems, and processes) and organizational 
arrangements associated with postdisaster 
reconstruction in Christchurch, New Zealand, 
following a series of earthquakes that occurred in 
2010 and 2011. It presents an initial analysis 
associated within an ongoing research project on 
decision-making processes directing infrastructure 
reconstruction. This analysis is informed by existing 
postdisaster reconstruction literature, government 
and project information directly related to 
Christchurch reconstruction, and an initial phase of 
semistructured interviews with professionals 
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(primarily engineers) involved in the reconstruction 
process in Christchurch. This work was also informed 
by the author’s previous experience working as an 
engineer in the reconstruction. 
The analysis is presented in two parts. It starts with an 
overview of the Christchurch reconstruction and sets 
the context for the reconstruction of horizontal 
infrastructure. This discussion includes a brief 
introduction to organizational roles in the 
reconstruction. The analysis then moves onto 
examining the impact of institutional and 
organizational arrangements on decisions. It explores 
how the design philosophy changed over time and 
how reconstruction effort is scoped at a project level. 
It is important to highlight that this paper does not 
analyse the appropriateness of the organizational 
boundaries, scoping, and prioritization, which will be 
considered in future work. Rather, the aim of this 
paper is to provide organizational context and explore 
the influence this has on the decision-making process.  
2. CHRISTCHURCH CONTEXT 
2.1. Overview 
Christchurch, with a population of approximately 
370,000, is the main urban centre in the Canterbury 
region of New Zealand. The region was hit by a series 
of earthquakes during 2010 and 2011. The first 
earthquake occurred in September 2010. Thousands 
of aftershocks have followed, including three major 
events that occurred in February 2011, June 2011, 
and December 2011. Homes were damaged, 
Christchurch’s Central Business District was severely 
affected, and horizontal infrastructure systems across 
the city sustained various levels of service loss. The 
February event caused the worst damage.  
The Christchurch City Council (CCC) set up the 
Infrastructure Rebuild Management Office (IRMO) to 
oversee the reconstruction process following the initial 
September event. This was formally launched in 
February 2011, just prior to the second major 
earthquake (CCC, 2011). The IRMO arrangement 
involved four lead contractors partnered with design. 
Contracts were won through a bidding process, and 
each contractor was allocated an area in the city to 
reinstate services.  
The increased level of damage caused by the 
February 2011 earthquake triggered a change in 
approach to the reconstruction process. It prompted 
the national government to set up the Canterbury 
Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) via the 
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act 2011, 
introducing national-level governance. Alongside this 
process, the CCC recognized that the IRMO 
arrangement was not suitable for the larger scale of 
repair required (Office of the Auditor General (OAG), 
2013). Ultimately, the Stronger Christchurch 
Infrastructure Rebuild Team (SCIRT) was formed as 
the joint venture organization to implement the 
reconstruction through an Alliance agreement.1 SCIRT 
is responsible for reconstructing the horizontal 
infrastructure within Christchurch city, reporting to the 
New Zealand Transport Authority (NZTA), CCC, and 
CERA. Estimates as of 2012 suggest that 528 km of 
sewer pipes, 124 km of water mains, and 1,021 km of 
roads were damaged (OAG, 2012). The estimate for 
delivering SCIRT’s work is NZ $2.496 billion, which is 
jointly funded by the New Zealand national 
government (through CERA and NZTA) and the CCC 
(OAG, 2013).  
2.2. Reconstruction of Horizontal Networks: The 
Strategy 
The Christchurch case presents a useful 
demonstration of how the scale of an event affects the 
nature of the response. Damage caused in 
September 2010 was significant, but CCC retained 
authority to manage the reconstruction process. IRMO 
operated on a project-by-project basis where 
contractors and consultants typically responded to 
specific issues as they were identified.  
The transition to SCIRT was accompanied by a 
transition to a catchment-level approach where design 
teams within SCIRT were allocated project areas 
based on wastewater network catchments (Figure 1). 
This placed greater emphasis on adopting a more 
strategic consideration of options for reconstruction 
and seeking ways to incorporate resilience to future 
earthquakes. For example, structural damage in a 
specific location could be placed in the context of the 
operation of the catchment network. Assessment of 
the wastewater networks included considering 
alternative technologies and adjusting the network 
layout to replace damaged sections of the existing 
low-gradient, gravity-fed system. Stormwater network 
analysis included assessing the increased risk of 
flooding and the overall capacity of the network, which 
required understanding catchment flows. Water 
supply and road assessment proceeded primarily on a 
street-by-street basis; however, some adjustments 
were made for closure of streets in red-zoned land 
(red-zoned land is discussed further in Section 3.2.). 
3. INSTITUTIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL 
ARRANGEMENTS: IMPACT ON DECISIONS 
3.1. Design Philosophy and Specifications 
The Alliance agreement sets specific boundaries 
around SCIRT’s scope of work. The agreement was 
predicated on restoring services to Christchurch, 
with the primary objective “To return the 
infrastructure networks to a condition that meets the 
levels  of  service  prior  to  the  4  September  2010 
 
                                                          




Figure 1. Reconstruction catchment areas, coloured according to rebuild programme start date. Map sourced from SCIRT data (map dated 
July 2013). Prioritization of areas forreconstruction was determined through consideration of multiple factors such as operational priorities, 
interdependencies, key services, external factors and other constraints (e.g. resources [SCIRT, n.d. a]) 
earthquake within the timing constraints of the 
rebuild” (CCC, NZTA, & CERA, 2013, p.3). In 
essence, this meant replacing damaged 
infrastructure on a like-for-like basis, where 
designers apply modern equivalent standards and 
materials. A secondary objective established that: 
“Where restoration work is undertaken, and where 
reasonably possible and economically efficient and 
viable, greater resilience is to be incorporated into 
the network” (CCC, NZTA & CERA, 2013, p.3). The 
definition of resilience is a topical debate in 
academic literature (as discussed in Alexander, 
2013). From SCIRT’s perspective (and for the 
purposes of this discussion), resilience is “the ability 
for the infrastructure (the roads, pipes etc.) to resist 
future earthquake damage. Improved infrastructure 
resilience can be achieved by using better materials, 
adopting higher construction standards, creating new 
systems, or minimising hazards.” (SCIRT, n.d. b)2 It 
proved difficult in some circumstances to justify 
improved resilience due to, for example, extra costs 
where the extent of a design needs to go beyond a 
specific damaged area to meet tie-in requirements, 
or the costs of augmenting substandard systems. 
Opportunities to make step-change improvements to 
the service or capacity of the network are considered 
but require approval for extra funding. To date, a 
                                                          
2Other definitions of resilience vary depending on the context. 
Even in the context of resilience to natural hazards, the discussion 
“ranges from ecological to social systems and also covers some 
socio-ecological spaces in-between” (Kuhlicke, 2010, p. 61).  
greater proportion of this funding has been allocated 
to improving the wastewater network compared to 
the storm water network and roads, with some 
allocation towards improving bridges. 
3.2. Assessment and Design Process 
An important aspect of any recovery process is the 
ability to change over time in light of new information 
(Olshanksy, Johnson, & Topping, 2006). SCIRT’s 
strategy initially focused on suburbs with the most 
badly damaged wastewater infrastructure, prioritizing 
the need to restore this service.3 The prioritization 
was determined on the basis of a multicriteria 
assessment. Infrastructure Recovery Technical 
Standards and Guidelines (IRTS&G) were developed 
by SCIRT’s clients to provide a consistent basis on 
which to justify restoration decisions. This document 
provided a basic framework that, in its early versions, 
supported a strategy of intervention at a threshold 
level of damage. While the reconstruction was 
always fundamentally guided by a principle of 
restoring services, the earlier versions of the 
IRTS&G had provided a prescriptive approach 
focused on fixing structural damage. This was 
generally viewed to be appropriate guidance for the 
most damaged wastewater networks. Here, the 
approach was essentially based on both the extent 
                                                          
3 Excluding the Central Business District, where demolition works 
had to take place before horizontal infrastructure damage could 
be adequately assessed and repaired or rebuilt. 
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of pipe fracturing and the loss of longitudinal grade, 
which can affect the ability of gravity-fed systems to 
operate. 
As design teams progressively moved into assessing 
low to moderately damaged wastewater catchments, 
it became clear that adherence to the threshold 
damage specifications outlined in the IRTS&G did 
not provide entirely suitable guidance for these 
areas. This approach was not structured in a way 
that encouraged the utilization of the remaining 
operational life of moderately damaged assets. As 
the focus shifted towards these areas, the basis of 
decisions was modified to place more emphasis on 
returning a minimum level of network services to the 
city. This approach was predicated on the basis that 
there is a finite level of available funding where the 
confirmed budget was less than early target 
estimates (this is discussed in the OAG report 
published in 2013). This funding needed to be 
allocated in a way that restored pre-earthquake 
levels of service from a citywide perspective; a 
process requiring trade-offs as to where to invest. In 
less damaged areas, there was an option to reduce 
reconstruction investment and accept higher levels 
of maintenance where the existing infrastructure can 
provide a minimum level of service. The increased 
maintenance cost is offset by reduced maintenance 
requirements of new infrastructure introduced in 
other areas.  
There had nevertheless always been a mechanism 
in the design process at SCIRT to challenge the 
guidance of the IRTS&G on any particular project. 
This process involved a Scope and Standards (S&S) 
committee that reviewed applications from design 
teams requesting deviation from the standards 
specified in the IRTS&G.4 The shift away from 
prescriptive intervention provided greater scope for 
engineers to consider alternative options. The 
IRTS&G was subsequently amended to provide 
better guidance for considering levels of service.  
One wastewater project in particular went through 
several design reviews, where design engineers 
looked for opportunities to pursue better value 
solutions because damaged assets still had 
significant remaining operational life. An important 
aspect here was that most of the original design of 
the existing wastewater network (primarily 
constructed in the 1960s) did not meet the minimum 
grade specification of current local standards. 
SCIRT’s project engineers believed that strict 
adherence to the intervention-based design 
guidelines in this case would overprescribe 
                                                          
4 All projects required sign-off by technical council staff 
representing CCC as asset owner representatives within SCIRT. 
The S&S committee is chaired by the CCC, and consists of six 
CCC members, one NZTA representative and one CERA 
representative. 
requirements for repair. A lifecycle cost analysis 
suggested that the up-front cost of relaying all 
subgrade pipes to more resilient standards (through 
steeper grades) was not warranted. The analysis 
included the possibility of earthquake damage 
occurring. The engineers proposed to relay pipes 
that had sustained a series of failures to “best-
available grade,” rather than to full compliance of the 
current standards. This proposal to deviate from 
guidelines was initially rejected by the S&S 
committee. However, as intervention-based 
guidelines were gradually superseded by target 
costs for meeting minimum levels of service, this 
proposal was reviewed and some deviations were 
ultimately accepted.  
It was estimated that the total cost of a fully 
compliant option for this project (in terms of strictly 
following intervention-based guidelines) was $NZ 44 
million. The current estimate is NZ $10.9 million. The 
current design introduces less resilience into this 
catchment area compared to the original proposal. 
There is also an element of deferral where pipes not 
replaced now will have a shorter asset life than new 
pipes and may require earlier replacement. However, 
reduced construction costs outweighed the risk of 
future damage and subsequent need for repair. In 
isolation, this project may be viewed as a lost 
opportunity to increase infrastructure resilience 
through the use of new materials and through 
designing a system with steeper grades. However, 
the accepted design makes greater use of the 
remaining asset life in the existing network. The 
savings made here also allowed for reallocation of 
the remaining budget for SCIRT into other areas of 
the city’s infrastructure. This is an important factor 
where there is limited funding available to 
reconstruct the city’s assets.  
3.3. Determining Intervention 
The assessment process for each network will not 
be addressed in this paper. While based on the 
same general philosophy, the reconstruction 
approach to each network has particular nuances. 
Aspects of the storm water network restoration are 
discussed below to demonstrate some of the 
challenges involved. 
The storm water network in Christchurch is defined 
through two key components: 
• The primary network, which consists of 
underground pipes, sumps, outlet structures, 
and stop banks. 
• The secondary network, which is the road 
infrastructure—kerbs and channels to direct 
surface water flow. 
SCIRT is “primarily concerned with the ‘hard-
engineered’ assets” (CCC, NZTA & CERA, 2013). It 
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is within the assessment remit to evaluate increases 
in flooding risk. However, in essence, any upgrade in 
the system in terms of adding capacity beyond what 
existed prior to the earthquake requires sourcing 
funding beyond that approved for SCIRT work. Also, 
area-wide land settlement and reduced capacity of 
waterways impacted the capacity of the storm water 
network, but these issues are not directly associated 
with damage sustained by the “hard-engineered” 
assets. 
In practice, it was challenging for storm water 
engineers to apply the principle of like-for-like 
replacement. Direct replacement of the damaged 
pipe network will not necessarily result in restoration 
of prior network capacity because changes in land 
levels have resulted in loss of hydraulic grade in 
some areas. This essentially meant that there is a 
reduction in the capacity of the system, as 
demonstrated in Figure 2. Where augmenting the 
primary system was considered as a practical 
intervention for restoring network capacity, 
engineers, asset owners, and funders had varying 
views on what level of repair was justified through 
the intervention-level guidance, what constitutes 
added resilience, and whether or not there was a 
need to source extra funding beyond that approved 
for SCIRT. 
A significant amount of land in the eastern suburbs is 
at risk of flooding. This was outlined in a recent 
report on climate change risk for the CCC by Tonkin 
and Taylor (2013) and was substantiated in a 48-
hour storm event in March 2014. Flooding was a 
prior risk that has been exacerbated by land 
movement associated with the earthquakes.  
In one SCIRT storm water project, a new storm 
water retention basin was proposed to restore a 
minimum level of drainage capacity to an area where 
no basin had previously existed. Reduction in land 
height in the area significantly reduced the hydraulic 
capacity of the primary network that existed prior to 
the earthquakes. The network relied on a storm 
water outfall in a tidal environment. The system is 
now more vulnerable to impact from high tide levels 
due to land settlement, and the capacity for storm 
water discharge is reduced (similar to the situation 
outlined in Figure 2). This was a case where a 
significant increase in risk of flooding attributable to 
earthquake damage justified augmenting the existing 
system with a storm water basin. There was also, 
fortuitously, reserve land in the area that could be 
made available for this purpose.  
In other areas, it was difficult to justify intervention to 
restore existing networks according to modern 
capacity standards. Issues associated with lack of 
capacity were as much associated with historical 
shortcomings of the network as they were a  
 
Figure 2. Conceptual sketch of longitudinal pipe and section with 
a tide-affected outflow. The top section shows the pre-earthquake 
situation. The change in hydraulic head (indicated by “dh”) is 
reduced in the lower section as a result of land movement caused 
by earthquakes. This reduces the capacity of the storm water 
system to drain in low-lying land, particularly during high tides. 
consequence of earthquake damage. The cost to 
improve the system could not be justified under 
SCIRT funding. 
An additional complicating factor for designing 
effective infrastructure solutions is the uncertainty 
around the future use of red-zoned land in the city. 
Land was zoned red in areas that sustained high 
levels of damage, had a high risk of future 
earthquake or flood damage, and where it is 
considered uneconomical to repair properties (OAG, 
2012). Much of this land area borders the Avon 
River. (refer back to Figure 1 to see the relative 
extent of red zone areas). In some places, this land 
was in areas that are potentially suitable for locating 
storm water retention basins. While SCIRT could 
make recommendations to CERA, it has no authority 
to influence decisions regarding red-zoned land. 
Now, over three years since the February 2011 
earthquake, there is still no clear picture about the 
future of the red zone, which is both a highly political 
and a complex insurance issue. The reconstruction 
of horizontal infrastructure has moved ahead in the 
absence of clarity here. As a general rule, building 
any infrastructure in red-zoned land has been 
avoided to date unless it has involved maintaining 
existing connections to service green-zoned land.  
4. DISCUSSION 
This paper examined the decision-making processes 
guiding postdisaster reconstruction of horizontal 
infrastructure. It has highlighted unique challenges 
that the postdisaster context poses for design and 
delivery processes. The Christchurch case study 




approach during the course of the recovery period. 
The response associated with earlier phases of the 
recovery was adjusted as needs changed over time. A 
twofold change in philosophy throughout the recovery 
effort provided greater allowance for using 
engineering judgment and applying more strategic 
thinking. This was demonstrated here primarily in the 
context of reconstructing the wastewater network 
which was significantly impacted by the changes. This 
first change is attributed to the move from IRMO 
location-based repairs to SCIRT catchment 
performance assessment. The second change was in 
the adjustment of repair philosophy away from 
prescriptive guidelines to attaining a minimum 
citywide level of service. This gave more emphasis on 
understanding the remaining asset life and 
maintenance costs of infrastructure assets in an effort 
to achieve a more effective distribution of available 
funding. 
This paper also outlined the challenges associated 
with restoring infrastructure services to predisaster 
levels and in attempting to capitalise on opportunities 
to improve the network. A key part of the challenge is 
in determining the actual loss of network capacity 
attributable to the earthquakes. Costs of augmenting 
existing networks had to be justified on a like-for-like 
basis, which is often not a clear-cut evaluation. While 
there is ostensibly an opportunity to introduce 
improvements as part of the reconstruction process, 
capacity upgrades will generally entail extra costs, 
and this cannot always be accommodated within the 
available funds. Finally, uncertainty over future land 
use limits holistic decision making for the horizontal 
infrastructure reconstruction task. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The question that underlies a significant amount of 
existing research into postdisaster reconstruction is 
essentially: what is the best way to facilitate the 
reconstruction process? The Christchurch case 
provides some insight into how decisions related to 
reconstructing horizontal infrastructure are made. 
Firstly, while taking the opportunity to improve 
networks and increase resilience are commendable 
ambitions, a lot of work and time was required to 
create a common understanding amongst the funders 
(CCC, NZTA, and CERA) and implementers (SCIRT) 
as to what this actually means in reality. Secondly, an 
understanding of requirements developed through 
time as those managing the reconstruction developed 
a more tangible sense of the nature of damage, 
possible repair options, cost of work, and available 
funding. Thirdly, SCIRT was able to react to changing 
conditions throughout the reconstruction process. 
However, it did so within the bounds of the Alliance 
agreement. Delivering on this agreement meant 
making decisions without certainty on related 
reconstruction issues outside of SCIRT’s remit.  
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